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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
A. ROBERT COLLINS and
GLADE N. JAMES,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No. 16648

vs.
EDWARD 0. BAILEY and
RUTH C. BAILEY, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs-respondents, hereinafter
referred to as "plaintiffs", for judgment as follows:
"l.

That an order to show cause issue immediately
requiring the defendants to appear and show
cause, if any they have, why they should not
be restrained from forfeiting the rights under
said contract until the court has had a full
hearing in this matter and entered its judgment
declaring the rights of the parties.

"2.

For a declaratory judgment declaring that the
terms and conditions of the real estate contract
which is Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint
have not been violated and that payments thereunder may continue pursuant to the terms thereof."
(Prayer of Compl.:J.ir.t, P.3)

Edward O. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey, his wife, hereinafter
referred to as "Baileys" contend that plaintiffs have breached
the provisions of said contract and pray for judgment against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiffs:
a.

No cause of action against plaintiffs and for
costs and a reasonable attorney fee.

(p.24)

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Each of the parties submitted the matter pursuant to
motions for summary judgments by the respective parties and a
motion for attorney's fees by Baileys for enforcement of the
contract under paragraph 21 of said contract which reads:
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should th<
default in any of the covenants or agreements contair
herein, that the defaultin
art shall a all cost;
an expenses, including a reasonable attorney's
fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this
Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premise;
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the Statutes of the State of Utah
whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit or
otherwise." (underscore added)
The court granted plaintiffs-respondents motion for ;
judgment and denied defendants-appellants motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the granted motion for summary judgment
and the granting of the motion for summary judgment of defendant
and motion for costs and attorney's fees for enforcing said
contract provision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Baileys and C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporat
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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designated as Buyer, made and entered a contract entitled Uniform
Real Estate Contract, designated as Exhibit "A" (p.6) on the
13th day of April, 1978, for the purchase of the following described
lands in Salt Lake County, State of

U~ah,

to-wit:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33
and 34, Block 6, Longview Park Addition, as
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, subject to
existing rights of way. (Exhibit M-D-1) (p. 6 and 53)
Three of said lots face on State Street and have a
business building thereon, and eight of said lots are in the rear
across the alley and had a storage building and were used for
parking. (p.53)
To definitely fix the persons responsible, Baileys
required a Guaranty (p.25) by and between said Baileys and A.
Robert Collins and Glade N. James, "principal officers" of said
corporation, wherein it was covenanted and agreed:
"Buyer, and A. Robert Collins and Glade N. James
are each jointly and individually bound to satisfy
the obligations of said C & J Industries, Incorporated,
under the terms of said Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and to perform each of the covenants and agreements
therein.
"Each and all of the parties to said Uniform Real Estate
Contract are each severally and jointly bound to perform the obligations, covenants and agreements of said
contract, said Edward 0. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey,
his wife, as Seller, and said C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporation, as Buyer, and said A. Robert
Collins and Glade N. James individually and jointly."
(Exhibit D-1 attached to Answer) (p.25)
That paragraph 3(a) of said Uniform Real Estate Contract,
Exhibit A, provides in part:
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"In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign,
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this contrac
or Buyer's interest in said premises, then and in th
event the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding
balance due on this contract prior to said transacti
(underscore added) (p.6)
On or about March 9, 1979, plaintiffs, Collins and
James, not the Buyers under said contract, but the Guarantors,
sold a portion of the subject real property and said office
building located thereon to one Jay L. Burgie pursuant to a Uni:
Real Estate Contract dated March 9, 1979, a copy of which contr
is attached to the Complaint herein and marked as Exhibit B,
(p .10) and said contract contemplated the transfer of three lot:
containing the building and all State Street-facing
nroperty (p.10), Lots 17, 18 and 19 of Block 6, Ten-Acre Plat";
Big Field Survey of Longview Park Addition. (p.53)
Under date of March 19, 1979, counsel for Baileys
mailed a letter (p.54) to each of plaintiffs advising of the
breach and asking it to be corrected. (p.54)
Baileys thereafter had prepared and served upon C &

c

Industries Incorporated, on April 4, 1979, upon A. Robert Collir
on April 5, 1979, and upon Glade N. James on April 9, 1979, a
"NOTICE TO REINSTATE THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT TO PURCHASE BY
PAYMENT OF ALL DELINQUENT AMOUNTS DUE AND OWING BY VIRTUE OF Tffi
SALE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO SAID CONTRACT OR FORFEIT ALL RIG
UNDER SAID CONTRACT".

(p .13)

Exhibit C.

Said Notices set fort

said subparagraph (a) of Paragraph 3 of said Uniform Real Estate
Contract and stated:
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"That said Jay L. Burgie, dba Ogden Beauty Supply
Company has reputedly purchased a portion of said
real property in contravention of said agreement
in that said 'the full and outstanding balance due
on this contract prior to said transaction' has not
been paid.
"In contravention of said specific provision of said
contract rights of said Buyer and interests of said
Buyer in said described properties have been sold,
or assigned or transferred or conveyed without the
'outstanding balance due on said contra~t' having
been paid to Buyer 'prior to said transaction.'
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE UPON YOU, SAID CONTRACT MUST
BE REINSTATED BY THE PAYMENT OF SELLER 'IN FULL THE
OUTSTANDING BALANCE DUE ON THIS CONTRACT'.
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT IF YOU CLAIM ANY RIGHTS
UNDER SAID CONTRACT, IF THE PAYMENT IN FULL IS NOT
PAID WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, NAMELY 30 DAYS, YOU
AND EACH OF YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT SAID CONTRACT
OF SALE IS TO BE TERMINATED AND CANCELLED BY REASON
OF SAID BREACH OF SAID CONTRACT AND REFUSAL TO PAY
THE FULL AMOUNT DUE AND OWING AND BY REASON OF SAID
REJECTION OF THE OFFER TO REINSTATE SAID CONTRACT."
(Exhibit C) (p. 13)
On April 26, 1979, plaintiffs filed the subject action
asking for an Order to Show Cause why a restraining order should
not issue restraining defendants from declaring a forfeiture
i.mder the terms of said contract and for a declaratory judgment,
and hearing was set for may 10, 1979, before the above entitled
court with the Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge presiding.
Paragraph 5 of said contract provides:
"5. It is i.mderstood and agreed that if the Seller
accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less
than according to the terms herein mentioned, then
by so doina, it will in no way alter the terms of
the contra~t as to the forfeiture hereinafter stipulated,
o:c as to any other remedies of the Seller."
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Paragraph 21 of said Uniform Real Estate Contract
provides:
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should
they default in any of the covenants or agreements
contained herein that the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforc
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State
of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing
a suit or otherwise."
Attached to the Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment was the record of payments sheet showing the
payment number of each and every payment made under said contrac
with the first payment due June l, 1978, and the written acknowl
ment of payments made which are underlined and how payments
made through May, 1979, were applied and the balance due and
owing on May l, 1979, which is $213,034.41.

(Exhibit M-D-3).

(p.55)
Hearing was had on said May 10, 1979, on said Order
to Show Cause.

The court ruled that a restraining order at

that time did not seem proper.
In order to facilitate the disposition of the matter,
the couttsaid that each of the parties might file a Motion for
Summary Judgment and that the parties might "get together on
the facts".

Motions were filed.

(p.19, p. 28)

Hearing on

said Motions was set for May 25, 1979, at 3:00 p.m. before the
court.

Counsel were invited to file written memorandum, if

they chose.

Written Memorandum were filed.

(p. 30, 43)
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An affidi

in support of motion for attorney's fees to enforce terms of
contract was filed.

(p. 84)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

The Uniform Real Estate Contract, the subject of
this action, was signed and agreed to by all parties to this
action.

Each, individually signed the same, each of the Baileys,

C & J Industries Incorporated, by its officers, A. Robert Collins
and Glade N. James, individually. (p. 9)
It should be noted that the Buyer under the contract
was C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporation, (p.6) and
the Seller under the purported contract of sale was Glade N.
James and A. Robert Collins. (Exhibit B) (p.10)

How the parties

are switching the ownership around is not clear.

How the property

was sold, transferred or assigned or how much is not known.
There had to be some.

The Buyer under the Uniform Real Estate

Contract, (Exhibit A) (p.6) is not the Seller of the premises
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Glade N. James and
A. Robert Collins and Jay L. Burgie.

(Exhibit B) (p.10)

The Guaranty, (p.15) signed by the parties was to
make each of the parties personally and jointly responsible
for the performance of said contract. (Exhibit D-l)(p.25)

Unknown

persons who were responsible for the corporation were made definite
by the Guaranty.
Paragraph 3 of said contract (p.6) reads:
"3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession
and pay for said described premises the sum of Two
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($220,000.00) payabl
at the office of the Seller, his assigns, or order
in Salt Lake City, Utah, strictly within the followi
times, to-wit: Two Hundred and Ninety-seven Dollars
and 31/100 ($2,297.31) per month commencing June 1,
1978.
(a) In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign,
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this contract or Buyer's interest in said premises then
and in that event the Buyer must pay in full the
outstanding balance due on this contract prior
to said transaction . . " (underscore added) (p. 6,
In Black's Law Dictionary, we read:
"With respect to ownership of external objects of
property, rights may be classed as absolute and quaL
fied. An absolute right gives to the person in whom
it inheres the uncontrolled dominion over the object
at all times and for all purposes. A qualified right
gives the possessor a right to the object for certair
purposes or under certain circumstances only."
(Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1559-under Classificatic
The Buyer took the subject property subject to the terms of the
contract which imposed conditions.

C & J Industries Inc. purcru

the property subject to the conditions of paragraph 3(a).

Bas~

on the facts and documents before the court, Glade N. James and
A. Robert Collins have no rights or interests in these premises
or in the contract.
conveyance of

The court must assume a sale, assignment, c

C & J Industries, Inc. rights or interests to

Glade N. James and A. Robert Collins in order for them to enter
the contract executed by them on March 9, 1979. (Exhibit B) (p.
If there were a sale, assignment or conveyance by C & J Industri
Inc. to Glade N. James and A. Robert Collins, then it was a brei
of paragraph 3 (a).

That paragraph requires that "prior to said

transaction" the "Buyer must pay in full the outstanding balance'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Section 22 of said contract provides:
"22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective
parties hereto."
Section 19, of said contract provides, in part:
"19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to the
Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty
deed conveying the title to the above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances . . "
C & J Industries Inc. had the right to assign its "rights"
and "interests".

The contrary is not contended.

However, prior to

said "sale, assignment, transfer or conveyance" the "buyer must
pay in full the outstanding balance due c:i this contract."

If

"buyer desires to sell or assign, transfer or convey Buyer's
rights under this contract or buyer's interest in said premises
then and in that event the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding
balance due on this contract prior to said transaction."
be more clear?
limitation.

What could

All parties signed this contract with this

The sale to Burgie was all of the business building

and property facing on State Street, the main thoroughfare.

The

retained portion is rear property consisting of parking space and
warehouse space.
The key to this business property is the front store.
The contract does not provide that a portion of the property may
be

~old,

assigned or transferred or conveyed.

The contract

specifically provides that if "the Buyer's interest in the premises
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is sold, assigned or transferred or conveyed the Buyer must pay
in full the outstanding balance."
The Seller is not trying to restrict the rights of
Buyer.

This was agreed to in writing.

e

Jay L. Burgie, is not t':

one Seller is looking to "not to commit or suffer to be committ1
any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said premises." (p.
Buyer can assign or sell to whom Buyer pleases but when Buyer
does, Seller is to receive "pay in full of the outstanding balar
In the instant case, "Buyer's interest in said premi:
was sold.

It was no one else's interest.

It was "buyer's inter

even though buyer was retaining some additional interest, but
buyer was selling "Buyer's interest."
What havoc the courts would wrought if parties were
permitted to sell, assign or transfer part of the properties sol
when parties had agreed not to sell, assign or transfer the pro·
perties purchased.

If one contracts not to sell the property,

can a court of law permit one to sell part of it, and part of it
again, and part of it again until for all practical purposes it
is all sold.

When one contracts not to sell a piece of properq

and courts cannot authorize the sale of part of the property.
Pandora's box would certainly be opened.
POINT II
THE PHRASE "RIGHTS OR INTERESTS" DOES NOT MEAN ALL
RIGHTS OR ALL INTERESTS, BUT INCLUDES A PART OR PORT!
The contract executed between the parties was designe
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t:

in part, to protect defendants against third parties obtaining
rights in the property over which defendants had no control.
To avoid that undesirable position, defendants required plaintiffs
to pay the balance of the contract price in the event plaintiffs
sold, transferred or assigned their interest in the property.
This was the only protection defendants had from outside parties
with whom they had no privity of contract.
Plaintiffs have argued that "rights" and "Interests"

ir

ls

refer to "all of their rights" or "all of their interests" and not

!!

just a portion of them.

The contract does not so provide.

Each

part is contained within the whole and when a condition applies
to the whole it applies to each part.

Plaintiffs contend that it

would be ridiculous under defendants' interpretation of the
contract to completely pay the balance of the contract if they sold
or assigned one square foot of property.
plaintiffs, plaintiffs need not sell.

The choice is with the

Plaintiffs reasoned that they

could sell all but one square foot of property without paying off
the contract since they would still own an interest in the property.
In attempting to determine the definition of "right"
or "interest", counsel was unable to find a Utah case in point.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court defined "interest in land"
in "In Re Rood's Estate, 38 N.W. 2d 70, 229 Minn. 73 (1949) as
follows:
"In the instant case, the prayer for relief
presented to the court the broad issue of declaring
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or ascertaining the title or interest of the applier
in the land. Obviousry;-the applicant's interest in
the land could not be determined without giving
consideration to the validity and extent of all encu
brances.
'Interest in land' is a broad term which
may refer to any one of a variety of estates or
fractional shares in realty. It may refer to the nr
equity or fractional property value possessed by the
owner over and above the sum total unpaid on outstanding encumbrances." (emphasis added)
ACCELERATION CLAUSES
To argue that Acceleration Clauses are against publi.
policy or illegal would be specious.

All of the parties agreed

the acceleration clause in writing.
Baileys sold to C & J Industries Inc. without any do1
payment.

The monthly payments were a small fraction over one p1

of the purchase price.

When interest rates were six percent pe:

annum rent was usually figured at one percent per month of the
purchase price or fair market value.

That was the way a fair

computation of the rental value was figured.

With interest rat1

soaring to fifteen and three-quarters percent prime rate, the
one percent per annum would not be feasible.

No bank would mak1

such a loan as there is no profit margin or inf la ti on considere1
This loan was made under the most favorable of conditions to th1
buyer.

The contract protected the seller against having anythi:

to do with any other buyer, assignee, transferee or purchaser.
That is a fair, legal and legitimate condition to a contract.
The only party capable of accelerating payment was C & J Indust:
Inc.

The contract was written for that express purpose.

That

was the purpose of subsection 3(a).
There is no question of fraud, or the lack of knowin
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1

the terms of the contract.

There is a desire to abrogate the

terms of the contract.
The court went on to state in Peck v. Judd, 326 P.2d 712,
7 Utah Zd 420:
"It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate
the contract of the parties. It may be conceded that
with an advantaged background we may be able to improve
on their work and considering the changed times and
conditions say what now appears to us to be fair under
such conditions. Possibly at least one of the parties
would agree. There is no reason why we should consider
the vendee privileged and entitled to our intervention
unless the conditions sought to be imposed on the
vendee are unconscionable . . .
"Further than to determine if enforcement of the
contract results in gross inequity, and unless and
until the enforcement would be highly unconscionable,
we should recognize and honor the right of persons to
contract freely and to make rea~ and genuine mistakes
when the dealings are at arm's length."
The provisions of Section 3(a) (b) and (c) are not
provisions of the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract.

This

contract was typed to specifically include paragraph 3(a).

There

is no question of fraud, unconscionable advantage taken, or deceit.
This contract provided simply that the Seller would deal only
with the buyer.

In the event buyer wanted to unload the contract

or take advantage of a sale that the seller must be paid out in full.
The Buyer could sell to anyone buyer chose upon such terms as buyer
might desire.

The buyer's interest in the contract and the premises

was so tied that if the buyer wanted out, the seller wanted out
first.

There is nothing fraudulent or unconscionable about that

situation.
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SALE OR EXECUTORY CONTRACT
In the Supplemental Memorandum counsel for plaintifi
quoted in part from 67 Am Jur 2d, "Sales", Section 8, in an att
to differentiate between a sale and an executory sale.

How eve

the final paragraph of Section 8 which plaintiffs omitted, clar
the artificial distinction between a sale and a contract for sal
It states as follows:
" . . . Although the Uniform Commercial Code defines
'contract for sale' separately from 'present sale,'
no distinction is made between the rights of the par
according to whether the transaction is a present sa
or a contract to sell, unless a provision of Article
expressly so provides. In short, pre-Code distincti
between a sale and contract to sell will continue un
the Uniform Commercial Code; but the distinction is
theoretical for most purposes, since the passing of
title is of relatively little importance under the
Code."
This section specifically states that no distinction
is made between the rights of the parties under either contract
form unless provided for by a provision of Article II.

However

Article II of the Utah Commercial Code applies only to goods
not the sale of real property.

~.

Since the present case involves

the transfer of real property, it is immaterial whether the
transfer of property was a sale or a contract for sale because
rights of the parties remain the same under both.
Plaintiffs further allege that transfer of title is
the key issue.

Section 8 states that the passing of title is

relatively unimportant.

We agree.

In most real estate transac·

the buyer rarely acquires title to the property he is purchasin!
unless he pays cash.

Real estate contracts are used extensive!
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throughout Utah with the seller retaining title until the purchase
price has been paid.

That does not mean that the buyer does not

have rights or interest in the property.
case the buyer

Obviously, in the instant

acquired some right or interest in the property

because they transferred a portion of it for value to a third party.
Whether the contract between plaintiffs and defendants is considered
a sale or a contract for sale becomes meaningless, since plaintiffs'
rights under either are the same.
FORFEITURE
Defendants filed an Affidavit in Answer to Verified
Complaint on Order to Show Cause setting forth that defendants'
action "is not to forfeit the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but to
require plaintiffs to abide by the terms of said contract and
particularly paragraph 3(a); that a restraining order should not
issue to restrain or enjoin defendants from enforcing the contract;
and that defendants are entitled to take such steps as may be
necessary to enforce a legally binding contract."(p.20)

The answer

to the complaint simply asks that judgment be entered against
plaintiffs of no cause of action, plus costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee.

(p.24)

One must not lose sight of the fact that defendants
are trying to retain the right to enforce a contract.

Plaintiffs'

action is an attempt to stop the enforcement of the contract.
There is no element in the pleadings any place of a proceeding
toward forfeiture.

-15-
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The trial court asked that two questions be briefed
subject action:
1.

Must the defendants pay the plaintiffs for the

improvements made on the property by the plaintiffs
during the time that the plaintiffs are in possessio
under contract in the event there is a default and
the defendants institute an action to declare a
forfeiture under the contract?
2.

Did the entering of the contract to sell three

the eleven lots for over seventy-five percent of the
original sellers sale price constitute a sale of the
property under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

(see page 14)

This doctrine found its origin in Utah law in the ca:
of Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401.
was the law clerk to the Chief Justice.
to Guild under contract in 1935.

At that time

Christy sold the premi:

Guilds were to pay $3,200.00

for the property in monthly installments of $30. 00 including bo:
principal and interest.
home and pay taxes.

Guild agreed to make improvements on

Default was declared because of failure

to make payments, failure to make improvements and payment of
taxes.

Compliance with the notice to correct defaults was igno:

Suit was filed for the breach and forfeiture sought.
Guild was required by the contract to make improveme:
on the property and did, in the approximate amount of $2,000.00
-16-
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The court noted that a credit for the improvements made were
more than absorbed in the monthly income from the property.
award for improvements was made.

No

It was only considered.

The landmark case in Utah law on this subject is Perkins
vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, wherein Perkins contracted
to pay $10,500.00 for the home, $2,500.00 down and the balance
at $75.00 per month until Perkins sold their home in Bountiful, Utah.
Perkins then were to pay off the balance.
standard Uniform Real Estate Contract.
but were unable to pay off the balance.
claim for forfeiture case.
FORFEITURE.

The sale was on a

Perkins sold their home,
Perkins v. Spencer is a

THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT FOR

This is a case to enforce the contract as

writte~

and as agreed in writing between the parties.
The court was concerned as to what would happen if the
case went to forfeiture.

Sellers DO NOT want forfeiture because

the rule laid down in Perkins v. Spencer, supra, as to how to
apply a forfeiture is as follows:
"(9) The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned
by them by any of these factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Loss of an advantageous bargain;
Any damage to or depreciation of the property;
Any decline in value due to change in market
value of the property not allowed for in items
1 and 2; and
For the fair rental value of the property
during the period of occupancy.

The total of such si.nns should be deducted from the
total amount paid in, PLUS ANY IMPROVEMENTS FOR WHICH
IT WOULD BE FAIR TO ALLOW RECOVERY, and any remaining
difference awarded to the plaintiffs."
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In the case before the court, the monthly payments a
$2,297.31 on a purchase price of $220,000.00 with no down payme
One percent of the value of commercial property is usually cons:
the fair rental value.

In other words, Baileys are getting the

fair rental value in the monthly payments.
$45,000.00 improvement on the property.

Buyer claims a

Where are the Baileys,

retiring out of their business, going to come up with the $45,0
for the

improvements?

Seller wants out, not the property.

Th,

is no way Seller can declare a forfeiture and come up with the
$45,000.00.
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, is a forfeiture case and!
been cited in twenty-six Utah cases on review and two federal
cases as well asin the Utah Law Review.

The citations are in:

Scoville v. Kellogg Sales Co., 1 Utah 2d 18, 261 P.~
Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 130, 270 P.2d 442
Jacobson v. Swann, 3 Utah 2d 65, 278 P.2d 294
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989
Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468
Nagle v. Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351,
471 P.2d 867
Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673
Corporation Nine, Inc. v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 53, 513
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145
Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 548 P.2d 889
Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709
Young Electric Sign Company v. Vegas, 564 P.2d 758
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371
Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712
Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801
Chu:nney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84
9 ULR 919
227 F 2d 637
147 FS 247
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Counsel has taken two cases under Uniform Real Estate
Contracts to the Supreme Court, bearing on forfeiture and improvements
namely:

Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, and Biesinger v.

Behunin, 584 P.2d 801.

The question of the Buyer being given

credit for improvements was raised in each case.

In each instance

it was shown that the loss of the Seller exceeded the improvements
made.

In the instant case, not permitting the seller to require

buyer to abide by the contract may require sellers, who have
retired, to pay buyer $45,000.00 for improvements, which they
do not have.

One must give credence to paragraph 3(a) as it is

a special condition written into the contract to protect Baileys
and all parties agreed to it.
At Christmas I found myself trying to put toys together
for the children and was getting nowhere.

In the yard, I find

myself trying to put a new implement or tool together and get
confused.

Usually, my wife sees my plight and will come over gently

and pick up the instructions and read them to me with the admonition,
"when all else fails, read the instructions."

Let's read the

paragraph; it states:
"3.

(a) In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign
transfer or convey Buyer's rignts under this
contract or Buyer's interest in said premises then
and in that event the Bu"e.,.. must pay in full
the outstanding balance due on said contract prior
to said transaction."
What does the instruction state?

(1)

"In the event buyer desires

to sell or assign", does not mean after he has sold, after he has
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assigned, but when the idea has been concluded to sell or assiw.
(2)

"buyer's interest in said premises", not to sell or assign

someone elses interest but "buyer's interest in said premises",
(3)

"Buyer must pay in full" the "outstanding balance" due;

(4) when must this be done?

"Prior to said transaction".

When

the buyer has the "desire" buyer "must pay in full" "prior to

tr

transaction".
Counsel was the author of said paragraph.

The intent

is expressed in the buyer's "desire" to "sell or assign".

Buyer

certainly had the desire but "prior to the transaction", priori
doing anything about it, Buyer "must pay" the seller "in full tr
outstanding balance" on the contract.

Reason would dictate that

when the money starts passing from all parties Baileys get their
first.

It does not provide Baileys can be ignored.
After two trips to the Supreme Court, one learns.

clause avoids the "forfeitures".

This avoids the "improvements'

This avoids "damage to" or "depreciation".
This avoids attorney's fees.
buyers".

Tr

This avoids lawsuit:

This avoids "rights of subsequent

This avoids "assignees".
Chief Justice McDonough stated in Cole v. Parker, suf

and as Judge Worthen restated in Peck v. Judd, supra, and Judge
Henriod reiterated in Carlson v. Hamilton, supra:
It is not our prerogative to step in and
renegotiate the contract of the parties .
There
is no reason why we should consider the vendee
privileged .
. unless the conditions .
. are
unconscionable . . . and we should recognize and
honor the right of persons to contract freely and to
make real and genuine mistakes when the dealings are
at arms length .
"
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Courts of equity should not interfere except when sharp
practice or a most unconscionable result is to be prevented.
No fraud is claimed.
minds.

No failure of the meeting of the

No failure to disclose, no sharp practice.

results.

No unconscionable

This is the simple case of enforcing the contract.

Why should it not be enforced?

The parties so contracted.

No

illegal provisions, no provision against public policy, what basis
is there for a court to step in and change the provisions?
is no claim that plaintiffs could not read.
did not read.

There

No claim that they

No claim that they did not understand.

According

to value only a little over seventy-five percent of the property
was sold.

"No cause" has been shown why the provision of 3(a)

should be ignored and set aside.
SUMMATION
In the case of Mortgage Investment Co., Inc. v. Toone,
17 Utah 2d 152, 406 P.2d 30, in considering a Uniform Real Estate
Contract it is stated:

"This is a contract duly executed by the

parties containing mutual obligations which are consideration for
each other."

So is the instant case.

Covenants are "binding unless

they are illegal, fraudulent, contrary to public policy, or
inequitable," Jensen v. Nielsen, supra.
Pecuniary inability of the defendant will not preclude
a decree for payment of the price where such a decree is appropriate.
§1422.

Williston on Contracts. Vol. V, Revised Edition, p. 3476,
There has been no claim that plaintiffs cannot pay.
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CONCLUSION
Baileys are praying:
a.

That the contract will be enforced as it is wri

b.

That Baileys will be awarded their attorney fee

and

and costs as provided in said contract for enforcement.
Res~ectfully

submitted,

),a/~/__£;~H4U
~/

/

~'V'T.

Quentin Cannon
Attorney for Defendants-Appellan
Ten Broadway Building, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
to Kay M. Lewis, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 320 South
300 East, Suite 1, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

84111, postage prepaid,

day of November, 1979.
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